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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
Kathleen M. McCauley *
Dana A. Dews **
I.

INTRODUCTION

With President George W. Bush's promise to continue working
toward tort reform, medical malpractice issues are once again
garnering media and voter attention.' This article examines recent judicial decisions and statutory amendments affecting patients and health care providers in the commonwealth in the context of medical malpractice law.
II. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT

Following the medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s, the
General Assembly passed Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act
("the Act") in an effort to contain rising costs and protect health
care providers from increasing malpractice insurance premiums.2
The Act provides a pre-trial screening tool, in the form of a Medi-

* Partner, Goodman, Allen & Filetti, P.L.L.C., Glen Allen, Virginia. B.A., 1990, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1995, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University. Ms. McCauley's practice concentrates on medical malpractice defense, hospital
and medical school representation, representation before the Commonwealth of Virginia's
health regulatory boards, general health care risk management, and employment law. In
addition to her practice, she is an Assistant Adjunct Professor at the University of Richmond School of Law.
** Associate, Goodman, Allen & Filetti, P.L.L.C., Glen Allen, Virginia. B.A., 2001,
Samford University; J.D., 2005, University of Richmond School of Law. Ms. Dews's practice concentrates on medical malpractice defense, representation before the Commonwealth of Virginia's health regulatory boards, employment law, and general business matters.
1. Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Comprehensive Immigration Reform (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/
print/20060601.html.
2. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMM. STUDYING VA. MED. MALPRACTICE
LAWS, H. Doc. No. 21 (1985).
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cal Malpractice Review Panel,3 and a cap on damage recoveries. 4
For injuries occurring between July 1, 2006 and June 30, 2007,
the cap stands at $1.85 million. 5 While the cap has increased annually by $50,000 from its inception, the Act states that it shall
increase by $75,000 in July of 2007 and 2008, with the 2008 increase being the final increase. 6
A. Definitions
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.1 defines the individuals and
entities that are considered "health care providers" for purposes
of the Act. 7 In 2006, the General Assembly added licensed marriage and family therapists to the definition of "health care provider."' Podiatrists were added to the definition of "physician"
under the provision of the Act granting immunity to physicians
for failing to review laboratory tests in certain situations.9
In addition to those changes made to Virginia Code section
8.01-581.1, the General Assembly expanded the scope of practice
of various health care providers through revisions to other sections of the Code. Physician assistants may now perform examinations on those persons employed to drive school buses,'" share
child immunization information for the purpose of protecting the
public health," conduct certain prenatal tests, 1 2 determine those
activities in which nursing home patients and assisted living facility residents may participate, 3 be compensated for performing
follow-up infant audiological examinations under the Board of
Medicine's plan for medical assistance services,' 4 and sign medi-

3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
4. Id. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
8. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 638, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum Supp. 2006)).
9. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 877, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.18 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
10.

VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-178(G) (Repl. Vol. 2006).

11. Id. § 32.1-46(E) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
12. Id. § 32.1-60 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
13. Id. § 32.1-138(A)(13)-(15) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (discussing the rights of nursing
home patients); id. § 63.2-1808(A)(18) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (discussing the rights and responsibilities of residents of assisted living facilities).
14. Id. § 32.1-325(A)(21) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
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cal statements for those individuals wishing to cancel their health
spa contract due to medical reasons.15 After July 1, 2006, nurse
practitioners may prescribe Schedules II through VI controlled
substances.16 Finally, individuals who have completed a training
program in dialysis patient care may now engage in provisional
practice to gain experience prior to receipt of their certification
requirements. 7 To provide patient care, the dialysis technicianin-training must be under the direct and immediate supervision
of a licensed dialysis technician and must be identified as a
"trainee.""8
B. PrivilegedCommunications1 9
In HCA Health Services of Virginia, Inc. v. Levin,2" the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the purpose underlying Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.17, stating:
The obvious legislative intent is to promote open and frank discussion during the peer review process among health care providers in
furtherance of the overall goal of improvement of the health care system. If peer review information were not confidential,
there would be
21
little incentive to participate in the process.

This statute provides that certain "proceedings, minutes, records,
and reports" of medical staff and review committees are privileged communications, not to be disclosed or obtained in discovery
unless the court orders such disclosure after a hearing and a
showing of extraordinary circumstances by the party seeking
these communications.22 In 2004, the General Assembly added
"l]ralcommunications regarding a specific medical incident" as a
type of communication protected under the statute. 23 The pro15.

Id. § 59.1-297(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2006).

16.
17.

Id. § 54.1-2957.01(A) (Supp. 2006).
Id. § 54.1-2729.3(B) (Supp. 2006).

18. Id. § 54.1-3408(R) (Supp. 2006).
19.

For a focused discussion of the discoverability of healthcare provider policies, pro-

cedures, and incident reports, see Michael L. Goodman, Kathleen M. McCauley & Suzanne
S. Duvall, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Discovery Divide: Virginia Code Section 8.01581's Quality Assurance Privilege and Its Protection of Healthcare Provider Policies and
IncidentReports, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 61 (2004).

20. 260 Va. 215, 530 S.E.2d 417 (2000).
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 221, 530 S.E.2d at 420.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 250, 2004 Va. Acts 372 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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tected oral communications are limited to those made within
twenty-four hours after the medical incident at issue.2 4 At the
General Assembly's most recent session, another category of
documents was added to the statute: "Irleports produced solely for
purposes of self-assessment of compliance with requirements or
standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations" ("JCAHO").25 By encouraging facilities to report
medical errors and, thereby, identify those areas ripe for change,
one of JCAHO's initiatives is to focus hospital accreditation standards toward the overall goal of improving patient safety. 26 The
General Assembly's inclusion of JCAHO reports in those documents protected from discovery under Virginia Code section 8.01581.17 supports not only the goals of JCAHO, 27 but also the purpose of the privilege statute as set forth by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Levin.28
C. Physician Immunity
In the last year, the statute dealing with physician immunity
for laboratory results has sparked the interest of both the Supreme Court of Virginia and the General Assembly. On June 9,
2005, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued its opinion in Auer v.
Miller,29 affirming the trial court's grant of immunity to Edward
Miller, M.D., under Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18." 0 The
plaintiff in Auer was admitted to the hospital by Lenox Baker,
M.D., his cardiovascular surgeon, for removal and replacement of
Auer's aortic valve. 3 On the day of the surgery, Dr. Baker requested a culture and sensitivity test ("C & S") of Auer's native
aortic valve.3 2 Neither Dr. Baker nor Dr. Miller, Auer's cardiolo-

ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
25. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 678, 2006 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.17(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
26. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 183-84 (5th ed. 2004).
27. Id.
28. See HCA Health Servs. of Va., Inc. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 221, 530 S.E.2d 417, 420

(2000).
29. 270 Va. 172, 613 S.E.2d 421 (2005), overruled by Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488,
621 S.E.2d 48 (2005).
30. Auer, 270 Va. at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 424.
31. Id. at 175, 613 S.E.2d at 422-23.
32. Id. at 175-76, 613 S.E.2d at 423.
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gist, reviewed the C & S. 33 The C & S revealed the presence of
staphylococcus, and, indeed, Auer later developed an infection in
his prosthetic valve. 4 He subsequently was diagnosed with endocarditis and died shortly thereafter.3 5
The court's decision was based upon the "clear and unambiguous" language of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18(B).3 6 At the
time of the court's ruling, that subsection provided for the immunity of:
Any physician ... from civil liability for any failure to review, or to
take any action in response to the receipt of, any report of the results
of any laboratory test or other examination of the physical or mental
condition of any person, which test or examination such physician
neither requested nor authorized in writing, unless such report is
provided directly to the physician by the person so examined or
tested with a request for consultation ....

The court concluded, based upon a plain reading of this statute,
that Dr. Miller was entitled to immunity, for he did not request or
authorize the 8C & S, nor was it provided to him with a request for
consultation.1
The court's "plain reading" of Virginia Code section 8.01581.18(B) was short-lived, for, in Oraee v. Breeding,3 9 decided less
than five months later, the Supreme Court of Virginia overruled
its decision in Auer.4" Dr. Oraee was called in for a neurology consultation when plaintiffs decedent was presented to the emergency room for complaints of facial drooping.4 1 Dr. Oraee confirmed through MRI that the decedent had suffered multiple
strokes, the causes of which were unknown, but Dr. Oraee confirmed a potential diagnosis of a clotting disorder perhaps caused
by antiphospholipid antibody syndrome. 2 Dr. Oraee requested a
rheumatology consultation by Dr. Kivanc, who ordered multiple

33. Id. at 176, 613 S.E.2d at 423.
34. Id.
35. Id.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 423.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.18(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
Auer, 270 Va. at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 424.
270 Va. 488, 621 S.E.2d 48 (2005).
Id. at 491, 621 S.E.2d at 49.
Id. at 492, 621 S.E.2d at 49.

42.

Id.
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tests for the decedent, of which Dr. Oraee was aware.4 3 Upon the
decedent's follow-up visit with Dr. Oraee, Dr. Oraee had not requested the results of the laboratory tests ordered by Dr. Kivanc,
and, as a result, Dr. Oraee was unaware that the tests confirmed
the diagnosis of antiphospholipid antibody syndrome." Twelve
days later, the plaintiffs decedent suffered a massive stroke and
was admitted to the hospital, where the diagnosis was confirmed
and the decedent was placed on anticoagulants. 5 The patient
died approximately one month later as a result of the second
stroke. 6 The expert testimony at trial established that had Dr.
Oraee been aware of the results of the laboratory tests on the initial follow-up visit and had the patient been placed on anticoagulant medication at that time, the second stroke would not have
occurred.17

At issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly denied
a grant of immunity for Dr. Oraee under Virginia Code section
8.01-581.18(B) for his failure to request the results of the tests
ordered by Dr. Kivanc.4" Writing for the 4-3 majority, Justice
Kinser asserted that subsections A and B of the statute should be
read in conjunction, so as to conform with the court's duty "'to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.' 49 Reading the
subsections together, the court held that physicians are only afforded immunity under Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18(B)
when the physician fails to review or take action regarding the
receipt of a laboratory report when the test or examination at issue was conducted "'not at the request or with the written authorization of a physician."'50 In interpreting the intent of the
General Assembly, the majority reasoned: "Overall, the provisions of Code § 8.01-581.18, create a mechanism for handling reports of the results of laboratory tests or examinations requested
by an individual rather than by a physician. The statute does not
pertain to reports of laboratory tests or examinations requested
43. Id.
44. See id. at 493, 621 S.E.2d at 50.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 494, 621 S.E.2d at 50.
49. Id. at 498, 621 S.E.2d at 52-53 (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bd. of County
Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 388, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983)).
50. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.18(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000)).
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or authorized by a physician." 1 Applying this interpretation of
the statute, the court held that Dr. Oraee was not entitled to immunity, for the tests he failed to review were ordered by a physician.52 With this holding, the court was forced to overturn its decision in Auer, stating that "[w]hile we adhere strongly to the
doctrine of stare decisis in this Commonwealth, this is one of
those rare situations in which we cannot perpetuate a clearly incorrect application of the law."5 3 The dissenting opinion, authored
by Justice Agee, disagreed with the majority's conjunctive reading of the subsections, stating that "[w]e have not held that a
statutory subsection must be read solely in reference to the subsection it follows; rather, we are always guided by the plain language of the statute as the General Assembly has written it." 54
The controversy was put to rest by the General Assembly in the
2006 session when it separated subsections A and B of the statute
into two distinct sections.55 Former subsection B is now codified
at Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18:1, and, while it remains substantially the same, the General Assembly expanded and placed
conditions on the physician's immunity. 6 No physician will be liable for failure to review laboratory tests that he or she did not
order, unless the report is provided directly to the physician, the
physician assumed responsibility for the result, or the physician
had reason to know that the tests were necessary in order to
properly treat the patient. 7 Moreover, the physician will not be
granted immunity unless that physician can establish that: (1) no
physician-patient relationship existed when the results were received; (2) the physician received the results without a request for
consultation and had not assumed responsibility for the results;
(3) the results were not critical to the physician's management of
the patient's care; or (4) the interpretation of the results was beyond the physician's scope of practice."

51. Id. at 499, 621 S.E.2d at 53.
52. See id.
53. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 53-54.
54. Id. at 502, 621 S.E.2d at 55 (Agee, J., dissenting).
(codified as amended at VA. CODE
55. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 684, 2006 Va. Acts ANN. §§ 8.01-581.18, -581.18:1 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
56. Id.
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.18:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
58. Id.
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D. Expert Witness
An essential component of a medical malpractice case, for both
the plaintiff and defendant, is retaining an expert who can testify
to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the defendant
either breached or complied with the standard of care in Virginia.59
In Hinkley v. Koehler,6 ° the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified
the expert witness requirement of Virginia Code section 8.01581.20, holding that to qualify as an expert witness, the expert
must meet both a "knowledge requirement" and an "active clinical
practice requirement."6 1 Virginia Code section 8.01-581.20 provides that:
A witness shall be qualified to testify as an expert on the standard of
care if he demonstrates expert knowledge of the standards of the defendant's specialty and of what conduct conforms or fails to conform
to those standards and if he has had active clinical practice in either
the defendant's specialty or a related field of medicine within one
year of the62date of the alleged act or omission forming the basis of
the action.

The court explained that, based upon its earlier holding in Wright
v. Kaye,6 3 the active clinical practice requirement must be defined
in terms of "the 'relevant medical procedure' at issue"' and in
"'the context of the actions by which the defendant [s] [are] alleged
to have deviated from the standard of care."'65 In Hinkley, the allegedly negligent conduct concerned the defendants' direct care of
the plaintiff during the course of her pregnancy.6 6 The expert
whose qualifications were in question served as an obstetrical
teacher and consultant, but he had not directly cared for any patients within the one-year statutory period set forth in Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.20.67 The court noted that "[o]ne of the pur59. See id. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
60. 269 Va. 82, 606 S.E.2d 803 (2005).
61. Id. at 88, 606 S.E.2d at 806 (quoting Wright v. Kaye, 267 Va. 510, 518, 593 S.E.2d
307, 311 (2004)).

62.
63.
64.
S.E.2d
65.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
267 Va. 510, 593 S.E.2d 307 (2004).
Hinkley, 269 Va. at 89, 606 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting Wright, 267 Va. at 522, 593
at 313).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wright, 267 Va. at 523, 593 S.E.2d at 314).

66. Id. at 89-90, 606 S.E.2d at 807.
67. Id. at 90, 606 S.E.2d at 807.
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poses of [the active clinical practice] requirement is to prevent
testimony by individuals who do not provide healthcare services
in the same context in which it is alleged that a defendant deviated from the standard of care."6" With this note, the court held
that the expert's qualifications did not meet the active clinical
practice criteria, and, therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting his testimony on the standard of care.6 9
While the Hinkley decision further defined the necessary requirements for expert testimony, the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Pettus v. Gottfried7 ° distinguished between expert and
factual testimony from a treating physician. 7' The defendant doctor in Pettus designated for introduction at trial certain portions
of treating physician Dr. Purohit's deposition testimony,7 2 as well
as testimony from the deposition of Dr. Evans, the treating emergency room physician.7 3 The plaintiff objected to Dr. Purohit's testimony on the grounds that it was speculative and amounted to
expert testimony not given to a reasonable degree of medical
probability.74 Further objection was made to Dr. Evans's testimony as being speculative and not documented in the medical record, in violation of Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B).7" The supreme court found that Dr. Purohit's testimony was his
explanation of the impressions and conclusions he formed while
treating the patient and was not the provision of a diagnosis; as a
result, this factual testimony need not be rendered to a reasonable degree of medical probability.7 6 Moreover, because the medical records referred to the "possibility of a central nervous system
embolic event," Dr. Purohit's testimony that the patient "could
have" experienced a central nervous system event did not deviate
from the medical records and was proper under Virginia Code
section 8.01-399." 7 The court excluded the remainder of Dr. Purohit's testimony, as it found that the testimony did not address his
opinions formed at the time of his treatment of the patient, but

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 91, 606 S.E.2d at 808.
Id.
269 Va. 69, 606 S.E.2d 819 (2005).
Id. at 78, 80-81, 606 S.E.2d at 825-26.
Id. at 73 & n.2, 606 S.E.2d at 822 & n.2.
Id.
Id. at 73, 606 S.E.2d at 822.
Id. at 74, 606 S.E.2d at 822-23.
Id. at 77-78, 606 S.E.2d at 824-25.
Id.
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rather constituted an expert opinion not offered to a reasonable
degree of medical probability.7" As for Dr. Evans's testimony regarding the emergency department nurses, the court held this
testimony inadmissible as speculative.7 9 Dr. Evans further testified regarding the possibility of hospital admission for the patient. " In reference to this testimony, the court stated that it was
admissible as factual evidence, for part of Dr. Evans's care of the
patient was to formulate a treatment plan.8 ' The court was unable to decide whether Dr. Evans's testimony complied with Virginia Code section 8.01-399, as the plaintiff may not have placed
the complete record before the court, and, therefore, the court
could not determine whether Dr. Evans's notes lacked any documentation regarding a potential hospital admission for Mr. Pettus.8 2 The court was forced to remand the case for a new trial, affirming in part and reversing in part the circuit court's decision. 3
As the court's decision in Pettus makes clear, adherence to the
requirements of Virginia Code section 8.01-399 is essential to the
successful navigation of a medical malpractice case. In 2005, the
General Assembly passed several amendments to this statute,
which in one sense narrowed and in one sense broadened the
scope of physician-patient communications that may be disclosed
in a medical malpractice case. 4 The amendments included the
addition of "signs and symptoms, observations, evaluations, [and]
histories" to the list of medical documentation that may be disclosed when the physical or mental condition of a patient is at issue in civil litigation. 5 The amendments narrowed the scope of
the statute by requiring that these signs, symptoms and diagnoses be contemporaneously documented at the time the physician
obtained or formulated the information. 6 Prior to this amendment, plaintiff and defense counsel could utilize, for example, a
letter from a treating physician to a specialist, detailing the treating physician's opinion concerning the patient. However, because

78. Id. at 78, 606 S.E.2d at 825.
79. Id. at 80, 606 S.E.2d at 826.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 80-81, 606 S.E.2d at 826.
82. Id. at 81, 606 S.E.2d at 827.
83. Id.
84. See Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 649, 2005 Va. Acts 905 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
85. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
86. Id.
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such a letter invariably may contain opinions which were not contemporaneously documented with the treating physician's care
and treatment of the patient, such a letter would now be inadmissible under Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B). 7
In addition to retaining a qualified expert to testify at trial, a
plaintiff must now secure an expert prior to filing suit. 8 In 2005,
the General Assembly added Virginia Code sections 8.01-20.1 and
8.01-50.1.89 These sections require that, at the time a plaintiff requests service of process, the plaintiff must have obtained a written opinion from an expert witness that the defendant on whom
service is requested deviated from the applicable standard of
care, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.9" The expert witness must be one who the plaintiff
believes would qualify as an expert under the Act.9 1 If a plaintiff
fails to obtain such a certification, the court will impose sanctions
and may dismiss the case with prejudice. 92 The statutes further
provide that, if a defendant makes a written request, the plaintiff
shall provide, within ten days of the request, a certification form
detailing that the plaintiff had obtained the written opinion from
an appropriate expert or that one was unnecessary because the
alleged negligence is within the common knowledge and experience of a lay jury. 93
In Nance v. Bon Secours,94 Judge Gary Hicks of the Henrico
County Circuit Court considered the interplay between Virginia
Code section 8.01-20.1 and service of process under Rule 3:3 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. 9 The court held that
when a defendant waives service of process and makes a general
appearance, that defendant waives his or her right to proof of expert certification under Virginia Code section 8.01-20.1.96 Under

87. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
88. See id. § 8.01-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
89. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 649, 2005 Va. Acts 905 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
8.01-20.1, -50.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
90. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-20.1, -50.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Virginia Code section 8.0150.1 is identical to section 8.01-20.1, but the former section pertains solely to wrongful
death actions. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. No. CL05-698, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 313 (Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2005) (Henrico County).
95. See id.
96. Id. at *6.
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the statute, the plaintiff is required to certify that he or she had
expert certification for his or her claim prior to requesting service
of process. 7 The statute makes no provision, however, for expert
certification when the defendant waives service of process.9"
Therefore, in Nance, the defendant's general appearance by
waiver of service of process constituted defendant's agreement to
the suit, and "no longer entitled [the defendant] to certification
pursuant to [Virginia Code] § 8.01-20.1." 99 After this decision, defendants should consider the import of the expert certification
statute prior to waiving service of process.
At issue in most, if not all, medical malpractice cases are the
damages sustained by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs decedent. Expert testimony is usually required to establish the damages of the
plaintiff, and speculative expert testimony is prohibited by Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1.1°o This section states that an expert witness in a civil case may testify and render an opinion
"from facts, circumstances or data made known to or perceived by
such witness at or before the hearing or trial."10 1 The information
relied upon by the expert in forming his or her opinion "need not
be admissible in evidence" if that information is the type of information normally relied upon by experts in forming their opinions regarding the subject at issue.10 2 While not a medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Vasquez
v. Mabini' °. clarified that, while the information relied upon by
the expert may be inadmissible, the testimony of the expert will
nevertheless be inadmissible if that testimony lacks evidentiary
support. 10 4 In Vasquez, the expert's measure of the plaintiffs
damages was based upon the expert's assumption that the decedent would have worked full-time, that she would have received
retirement benefits from that full-time work, and further that her
income would have increased each year.0 5 The defendant was

97. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
98. Id.; accordNance, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 313, at *5.
99. See Nance, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 313, at *6.
100. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006); see also
Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465-66
(1995) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006)).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
102. Id.
103. 269 Va. 155, 606 S.E.2d 809 (2005).
104. See id. at 159, 606 S.E.2d at 811.
105. Id. at 160-61, 606 S.E.2d at 811-12.
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able to prove, however, that the decedent had been seeking fulltime employment but had never actually found full-time work. 106
Therefore, the court found that the expert's testimony was purely
speculative and inadmissible, despite the fact that the information he relied upon was normally the type relied upon by experts
in his field.107
E. Expressions of Sympathy
The effect of a health care provider's apology to a patient is a
topic of much debate in both the legal and medical communities.
The Veteran's Administration Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky
adopted a novel disclosure policy concerning possible negligence,
including requirements to notify patients of potential problems
with their care and to hold face-to-face meetings with patients
and their families to fully disclose all aspects of these problems."' 8
Several states have taken legislative approaches to this issue, enacting laws that provide civil immunity for those health care providers who express sympathy and benevolence to their patients.10 9 Massachusetts sparked the trend in 1986, excluding
expressions of sympathy by health care providers from admissibility at trial.110 The trend continued with similar enactments in
Texas, California, Florida, and Washington."' To date, more than
twenty-four states have either passed or introduced similar legislation.1 12
Virginia is following the trend; health care providers in the
commonwealth can now say "I'm sorry" to patients without fear of
these sentiments being construed as an admission of liability at
trial. The Virginia General Assembly incorporated into the Medical Malpractice Act a section focused solely on expressions of
sympathy by health care providers.11 3 Virginia Code section 8.01-

106. Id. at 160, 606 S.E.2d at 811-12.
107. See id. at 160-61, 606 S.E.2d at 811-12.
108. See Catherine A.G. Sparkman, Health Policy Issues: Legislating Apology in the
Context of Medical Mistakes, 82 AORN J. 263, 264 (2005), available at http://www.aorn.
org/journal/2005/aughpi.htm.
109. Id. at 264, 266.
110. Id. at 264.
111. Id. at 266.
112. See id.
113. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 649, 2005 Va. Acts 905 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.20:1 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
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581.20:1 provides that any "statements, writings, affirmations,
benevolent conduct, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy,
or general sense of benevolence" made by a health care provider
are inadmissible as evidence of liability or an admission against
interest when suit is brought against the health care provider by
the patient to whom such expressions of sympathy were made. 114
F. Theories of Liability
While the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act governs the mechanics of a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff decides the
theory under which the health care provider may be found liable.
In three recent cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia narrowed
the range of liability theories available, including narrowing the
scope of the Act itself.
In Sanchez v. Medicorp Health System,"' the Supreme Court of
Virginia declined again to adopt the theory of vicarious liability in
medical malpractice actions in Virginia.'1 6 This medical malpractice action arose out of allegedly negligent care and treatment
provided to plaintiff Leasly Sanchez at the Mary Washington
Hospital emergency room." 7 As part of his suit, Sanchez claimed
that the emergency room physician was "held out" by the hospital
as its employee, and, therefore, the hospital was vicariously liable
for the physician's negligence under the theory of apparent or ostensible agency."' While the issue of the physician's negligence
under this theory had not been addressed by the court prior to
this decision,11 9 the court looked to its decisions involving claims
of vicarious liability in other areas of the law, such as contract
law. 120 However, in the tort context, the court noted it had never
decided the issue of apparent agency.'
The court declined to
hold the hospital in this case liable under a theory of apparent
agency, stating: "[W]e have not previously imposed vicarious liability on an employer for the negligence of an independent con-

114. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (Cum.Supp. 2006).
115. 270 Va. 299, 618 S.E.2d 331 (2005).
116. Id. at 301, 618 S.E.2d at 332.
117. Id. at 301-02, 618 S.E.2d at 332.
118. Id. at 302, 618 S.E.2d at 332.
119. Id. at 306, 618 S.E.2d at 334.
120. Id. at 306-07, 618 S.E.2d at 335.
121. See id.
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tractor on the basis of apparent or ostensible agency, or agency by
estoppel. We find no122reason to do so in the specific context presented in this case."
In a claim based solely on the theory of vicarious liability, the
Supreme Court of Virginia has found that a dismissal with prejudice of the physician does not necessarily exonerate the physician's employer. 121 In Shutler v. Augusta Health Care for Women,
P.L.C., the court considered whether a dismissal with prejudice of
the allegedly negligent physician, Dr. Brooks, would preclude
Shutler from pursuing her claims against the physician's group,
Augusta Health Care.1 24 Shutler alleged that, at all times relevant to the allegedly negligent conduct at issue, Dr. Brooks was
an agent and employee of Augusta Health Care and acting within
the scope of his employment. 25 Therefore, she asserted a claim of
vicarious liability against the group. 126 The day prior to trial,
Shutler filed a motion to dismiss Dr. Brooks with prejudice but
proceeded against Augusta Health Care. 27 The trial court entered an order consistent with Shutler's motion, and counsel for
defendants endorsed the order with no objections.128 On the same
day the order was entered, Augusta Health Care filed a motion
for summary judgment, claiming that the dismissal "with prejudice" of Dr. Brooks was equivalent to a determination on the merits that he was not liable; therefore, since Augusta Health Care's
liability was predicated upon the liability of Dr. Brooks, Augusta
Health Care should be exonerated. 129 The trial court granted
summary judgment for Augusta Health Care. 3 0
On appeal, Shutler contended that, with its endorsement of the
order, Augusta Health Care waived its right to assert that the
dismissal of Dr. Brooks precluded the plaintiffs claims against
the group."'3 The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that ordinarily
a dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication on the
122. Id. at 307-08, 618 S.E.2d at 335.
123. Shutler v. Augusta Health Care for Women, P.L.C., 272 Va. 87, 93, 630 S.E.2d
313, 316 (2006).
124. Id. at 89, 630 S.E.2d at 314.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 90, 630 S.E.2d at 314.
128. Id.
129. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 314-15.
130. Id. at 91, 630 S.E.2d at 315.
131. Id. at 92, 630 S.E.2d at 315.
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merits and a final disposition of the claim. 3 2 However, such a
dismissal must be considered in light of the relevant circumstances, 133 and, in the circumstances of this case, the order specifically provided that only Dr. Brooks would be dismissed and
the action would proceed against Augusta Health Care.' 34 In light
of that order, the court held that the dismissal of Dr. Brooks with
prejudice would "have [no] preclusive effect on Shutler's ability to
pursue her claims against Augusta Health Care."'3 5 Justice Kinser, joined by Justice Agee, dissented, stating that the matter did
indeed proceed against Augusta Health Care, albeit for a short
period of time. ' The terms of the order did not preclude Augusta
Health Care from seeking summary judgment.'3 7
The reach of the Medical Malpractice Act was considered by
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Harris v. Kreutzer.'3 8 In this
case, the court considered whether a physician performing an independent medical examination under Rule 4:10 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Virginia could be held liable for negligence
under the Medical Malpractice Act. "' The trial court in an automobile accident matter ordered the plaintiff to submit to a Rule
4:10 medical examination; Dr. Kreutzer was the physician retained to perform the examination. 140 The plaintiff later brought
a medical malpractice action against Dr. Kreutzer, alleging he
failed to comply with the standard of care during the Rule 4:10
examination by failing to appropriately examine the plaintiff and
by being deliberately abusive to her. 4 1 Moreover, Harris's complaint alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, stating
that Dr. Kreutzer's performance of the examination was "'intentionally designed to inflict emotional distress upon [her] or was
done with reckless disregard for the consequences when he knew.
. . that emotional distress would result."' 4 In considering Harris's medical malpractice claim, the trial court held that, while a

132. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 316.
133. Id. at 93, 630 S.E.2d at 316 (citing Reed v. Liverman, 250 Va. 97, 100, 458 S.E.2d
446, 447 (1995)).
134. Id.
135. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 316-17.
136. Id. at 96, 630 S.E.2d at 318 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Kinser, J., dissenting).
138. 271 Va. 188, 624 S.E.2d 24 (2006).
139. Id. at 196, 624 S.E.2d at 29.
140. Id. at 193, 624 S.E.2d at 27.
141. Id. at 194, 624 S.E.2d at 27.
142. Id., 624 S.E.2d at 28 (alteration in original).
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cause of action under the Medical Malpractice Act could be cognizable in the context of a Rule 4:10 exam, this case was "not such
an example."14 ' The trial court further held that the claim did not
possess the requisite elements to support a finding of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 1 44 In considering these same issues, the supreme court found that, by bringing her personal injury action, Harris had put her mental or physical condition at issue, and thereby gave her implied consent to the independent
medical examination and formed "a limited relationship with Dr.
Kreutzer for purposes of the examination."'14' The court further
determined that Dr. Kreutzer owed a legal duty to Harris, stating, "[U]nder the plain language of the malpractice statute ... a
cause of action for malpractice may lie in the context of a Rule
4:10 examination because 'health care' is provided by a 'health
care provider' to a 'patient' which allegedly resulted in personal
'
injury."146
In holding that Dr. Kreutzer could be held liable under
the Act, the court limited the Rule 4:10 physician's duty to comply
with the standard of care to the actual context of the examination
itself.147 In reference to the emotional distress claim, the court
held that Harris did not plead facts sufficient to meet the "outrageous and intolerable conduct" element or the severity element. 148
The conduct alleged to have caused Harris emotional distress
was, among other things, Dr. Kreutzer's verbal abuse, raising his
149
voice to the plaintiff, and his accusing the plaintiff of faking.
The court found that, even if all these accusations were true, Dr.
Kreutzer's conduct, while perhaps "insensitive and demeaning,"
did not rise to the level of outrageous or intolerable conduct.' 5 °
Furthermore, Harris's emotional distress was not severe, according to the court.' Harris's symptoms included sleeplessness, loss
of self-esteem, and depression.'5 2 These symptoms were not ones
which no reasonable person could be expected to endure,15 and,
as
3
such, the court held that Harris's distress was not severe.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 195, 624 S.E.2d at 28.
See id.
Id. at 199, 624 S.E.2d at 30.
Id. at 200, 624 S.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 202, 624 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 204-05, 624 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 204, 624 S.E.2d at 33.
Id., 624 S.E.2d at 33-34.
Id. at 204-05, 624 S.E.2d at 34.
Id.
Id. at 205, 624 S.E.2d at 34.
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Yet another decision in which the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered the scope of the Medical Malpractice Act concerned
the sexual assault of a nursing home patient. In Alcoy v. Valley
Nursing Homes, Inc.,
the court concluded that the sexual assault of the patient occurred as a result of the nursing home's failure to provide proper personnel and security systems.15 The Alcoy case concerned the sexual assault of an elderly resident of a
Northern Virginia nursing home.'
The resident died approximately eight months after the assault, and the administrator of
her estate filed an action against the nursing home alleging negligence, sexual assault, and battery.' 5 7 The trial court found that
the plaintiffs claims fell within the purview of the Medical Malpractice Act, and the court granted summary judgment for the
nursing home because the plaintiffs witnesses were not qualified
to render expert testimony on the standard of care."'5 The plaintiff appealed, contending that all of the claims arose, not from
medical care provided to the decedent, but from the nursing
home's failure to provide adequate security and personnel to protect the residents from physical harm. 15' The supreme court
agreed, finding that the alleged negligence did not involve the
provision of medical services at all. 6 ° Rather, the negligence involved:
[Aidministrative, personnel, and security decisions related to the operation of the [nursing home], rather than to the care of any particular patient....
By their terms, the definitions of "malpractice" and "health care"
[in the Act] apply to patients on an individual basis, rather than to
the staffing and security of any medical facility in which the patients
are located. 161

This decision underscores the need to examine the exact, negligent act to determine whether the Medical Malpractice Act applies.

154. 272 Va. 37, 630 S.E.2d 301 (2006).
155.

Id. at 43, 630 S.E.2d at 304.

156. Id. at 40, 630 S.E.2d at 302.
157.

Id.

158. Id.
159.

Id. at 40-41, 630 S.E.2d at 302.

160. Id. at 43, 630 S.E.2d at 304.
161. Id.
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III. EVIDENCE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
Thornton v. Glazer"' concerns a trial court's refusal to allow
deposition testimony of a treating physician as part of a rebuttal
and refusal to offer an adverse witness jury instruction regarding
deposition testimony introduced during the plaintiffs case-inchief.'6 3 In rebuttal to the defendant's expert witness, the plaintiff
sought to introduce the deposition testimony of treating physi64
cian, Dr. Jones, who had previously testified and been released. 1
The court refused to allow the plaintiff to introduce the rebuttal
deposition testimony on the grounds that Rule 4:7 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Virginia does not apply once a witness has
attended trial and been released.'6 5 Rule 4:7(a)(4) provides for the
use at trial of deposition testimony if the court determines:
[T]hat the witness is a judge, or is a superintendent of a hospital for
the insane more than 30 miles from the place of trial, or is a physician, surgeon, dentist, chiropractor, or registered nurse who, in the
regular course of166his profession, treated or examined any party to the
proceeding ....

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that Rule
4:7(a)(4)(E) does not require unavailability of the witness as a
prerequisite to introduction of his or her deposition testimony. 167
The court held that "a party is entitled to offer into evidence the
deposition testimony of a treating physician even if the physician
is available, unless the trial court finds 'good cause' . . . to order
attendance to testify ore tenus." 1 s The court further held that the
adverse witness jury instruction was proper and should not have
been refused.' 69 When a plaintiff introduces testimony from an
adverse witness, even if that testimony is by deposition, an adverse witness jury instruction is appropriate. 170
The Supreme Court of Virginia has determined that the affirmative defense of mitigation of damages need not be specifi-

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

271 Va. 566, 628 S.E.2d 327 (2006).
Id. at 568, 628 S.E.2d at 327.
Id. at 569, 628 S.E.2d at 328.
Id.
VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:7(a)(4)(E).
Thornton, 271 Va. at 570, 628 S.E.2d at 328-29.
Id., 628 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 571-72, 628 S.E.2d at 329-30.
See id., 628 S.E.2d at 329.
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cally pled prior to its assertion at trial, if the issue has been
shown by the evidence.' 7 1 In Monahan v. Obici Medical Management Services, Inc.,
the court held that, though the defendant
had not raised mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense in
any of the pleadings, the defendant should be allowed to offer an
instruction on mitigation of damages, provided that the evidence
supports such an instruction.1 73 However, the court ultimately
ruled that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's instruction on mitigation of damages as there was no evidentiary
basis to support this instruction. 174
The importance of the contemporaneous objection rule was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Bitar v. Rahman.'7 5
At trial in Fairfax County, plaintiff offered the testimony of Dr.
Elliot W. Jacobs as an expert on the standard of care for a reasonably prudent plastic surgeon.' 7 6 At the close of the plaintiffs
case, the defendant moved to strike the testimony of Dr. Jacobs,
stating that Dr. Jacobs failed to express his expert opinions to a
reasonable degree of medical probability. 177 The trial court took
the motion under advisement, but when the defendant renewed
the motion at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court denied
the motion, finding the motion untimely as no objection was made
contemporaneously with Dr. Jacobs's testimony.'7
On appeal, the defendant, Dr. Bitar, asserted that the trial
court erred in not striking Dr. Jacobs's testimony as it was not offered to a reasonable degree of medical probability and, further,
that Dr. Jacobs's testimony was insufficient to establish a breach
of the standard of care and causation.' 7 9 The supreme court held
that Dr. Bitar's objection challenged the admissibility of the evidence, rather than the sufficiency.' Therefore, any objections to
the testimony should have been made when the evidence was pre-

171. Monahan v. Obici Med. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 271 Va. 621, 631-32, 628 S.E.2d 330,
336 (2006).
172. 271 Va. 621, 628 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
173. Id. at 634, 628 S.E.2d at 337.
174. Id. at 637, 628 S.E.2d at 339.
175. 272 Va. 130, 630 S.E.2d 319 (2006).
176. See id. at 134, 630 S.E.2d at 321.
177. Id. at 135, 630 S.E.2d at 322.
178. Id. at 136, 630 S.E.2d at 322-23.
179. Id. at 137, 630 S.E.2d at 323.
180. Id. at 140, 630 S.E.2d at 325.
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sented, not after the opposing party had rested their case.18 1
While the court recognized that a contemporaneous objection
would have been difficult, it stated that the defect in Dr. Jones's
testimony was obvious by the end of the direct
examination and
82
objection should have been made at that time. 1
The other issue on appeal was the sufficiency of Dr. Jacobs's
testimony to establish a breach of the standard of care and a
causative link between the alleged breach and the plaintiffs
damages.' Dr. Jacobs opined that Dr. Bitar was negligent in his
performance of a tummy tuck upon the plaintiff; specifically, Dr.
Jacobs opined Dr. Bitar was negligent in removing an excessive
amount of tissue from the plaintiff, which caused "tension upon
the abdominal flap, which resulted in inadequate blood supply,
death of the tissue, and 'a cosmetically displeasing appearance to
[the plaintiffs] lower abdomen."' 1 4 Based upon these statements,
the court concluded that Dr. Jacobs's testimony provided sufficient evidence to support the verdict for the plaintiff.' 5
IV.

WRONGFUL DEATH

In a case of first impression in Virginia, the Supreme Court of
Virginia ruled that an estate administrator may not proceed pro
se in a wrongful death action.' 6 Venunadh Kone, the administrator of the estate of Jampal R. Gummalla, filed three separate
wrongful death actions against Bon Secours-St. Mary's Hospital,
Dr. Michael D. Mandel, and Dr. Claude W. Wilson. l" 7 Subsequently, these three actions were nonsuited, and Kone filed a single wrongful death action against the same three health care providers.'
This single action was filed by Kone pro se. 8 9 The
defendants moved to dismiss the action, asserting that the motion
for judgment constituted a nullity, as it was not signed by a li-

181. Id. at 139, 630 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 271 Va. 646, 655,
629 S.E.2d 181, 185 (2006)).
182. Id. at 140, 630 S.E.2d at 325.
183. See id. at 141, 630 S.E.2d at 325.
184. Id. at 142, 630 S.E.2d at 326.
185. Id. at 142-43, 630 S.E.2d at 326.
186. Kone v. Wilson, 272 Va. 59, 62-63, 630 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2006).
187. Id. at 61, 630 S.E.2d at 745.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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censed attorney, and the statute of limitations had not been
tolled. 9 ° The trial court granted this motion and dismissed the
action with prejudice. 191
Kone appealed the decision of the circuit court, contending that
he, as the personal representative, "step[ped] into the shoes" of
the decedent, and, under the language of Virginia Code section
8.01-50, could bring the action in his own name.1 92 Virginia Code
section 8.01-50 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very [wrongful
death action] shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative of such deceased person."19 3 The court disagreed,
finding that, while the statute vests the right of action in the personal representative, the action is brought on behalf of the decedent's beneficiaries. 91 4 The court held:
[Blecause Kone's right of action existed only to permit him to prosecute the cause of action belonging to [Gummalla's] statutory beneficiaries, and not to maintain any cause of action personal to Kone
himself, he was not entitled to file the wrongful death action pro se.
His surrogate status precluded a pro se filing because he was acting
in a representative capacity for the true parties in interest, [Gummalla's] beneficiaries. Therefore . . . the circuit court correctly concluded
the Kone could not file a valid wrongful death action pro
195
se.

Kone further argued that the action should not have been dismissed by the circuit court, but, rather, the court should have allowed Kone's attorney to file an amended motion for judgment or
entered an order relating back his counsel's signature to the initial pleading.' 9 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with
both arguments. 19 Both of these arguments require the existence
of a valid initial pleading, but Kone's initial pleading was invalid
and without legal effect.' 9 Without a valid motion for judgment,
there were no pleadings before the court which could be amended

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
S.E.2d

Id. at 62, 630 S.E.2d at 745.
Id.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
Kone, 272 Va. at 62, 630 S.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 62-63, 630 S.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 63, 630 S.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 62, 630 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 63, 630 S.E.2d at 746 (citing Nerri v. Adu-Gyamfi, 270 Va. 28, 31, 613
429, 430 (2005)).
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nor any pleadings to which a signature could have related back. 199
Moreover, the relation back statutes-Virginia Code sections
8.01-6 to -6.2-are limited to instances in which a party seeks to
correct a misnomer, add a party, or add a claim or defense.2 "' The
court stated that a defect in a signature cannot be corrected
through relating back a valid signature.20 '

V.

VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY
COMPENSATION PROGRAM

The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Program ("the Program") was enacted by the Virginia General
Assembly in 1987, in response to the growing costs of malpractice
insurance coverage.20 2 For those infants born in the commonwealth with qualifying birth-related neurological injuries, the
Program provides coverage for those necessary expenses which
exinsurance fails to cover, including medical expenses, hospital
20 3
penses, rehabilitation expenses, and in-home nursing care.
In 2006, the General Assembly amended the process for reviewing certain birth-related injury cases. Senate Bill 632 extended the date-from July 1, 2000, to July 1, 2007-by which
the legal representative of a child born between January 1, 1988
and July 1, 1993 may file an application for review. 2° ' The bill
further simplified the conditions for the filing of such an application for review; the claim must have been timely filed for the child
and dismissed upon a finding that the child's injuries did not
qualify under the Program requirements.2 5

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Act of Mar. 27, 1987, ch. 540, 1987 Va. Acts 830 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006)).
203. See Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program, Who We
Are, http://www.vabirthinjury.com/WhoWeAre.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
204. S.B. 632, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2006) (enacted as Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch.
919, cl. 2, 2006 Va. Acts __).

205. Id.
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VI. THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS

The Virginia Department of Health Professions ("DHP") is
composed of various health regulatory boards,2 °6 which have the
authority to, among other things, license and discipline the
health care providers in the commonwealth.2"7 In 2006, the legislature revised several statutes pertaining to the DHP, regarding
matters from fees to reporting disciplinary actions.
Virginia Code sections 54.1-113 and 54.1-2505 were amended
by the General Assembly to prohibit certain transfers of fees collected on behalf of health regulatory boards. 20 ' Funds which are
generated by fees collected on behalf of the boards must now be
held exclusively to cover the expenses of the boards, the Health
Practitioner's Intervention Program, and the DHP and may not
be transferred to another agency. 20 9 An exception is made for the
additional fee charged to those persons being licensed as practical
or registered nurses; this fee will continue to be deposited into the
Nursing Scholarship and Loan Repayment Fund and be utilized
to fund scholarships for full-time nursing students.210
A new addition to the Board of Medicine's licensure capabilities
allows the Board to issue restricted volunteer licenses to health
care practitioners for voluntary practice in clinics organized exclusively or partially for the provision of free health care services. 2 " The restricted volunteer license is available to a practitioner who: (1) held an unrestricted license to practice at the time
the license expired or became inactive; (2) is currently practicing
within the limits of his license; and (3) attests to knowledge of the
laws and regulations governing the practice of medicine in Virginia.212 If the practitioner does not meet the requirement of having an active, unrestricted license and has not been engaged in
active practice within the past four years, a physician with an active, unrestricted license must review "the quality of care" ren206. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2503 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
207. Id. § 54.1-2400 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
208. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 631, 2006 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-113, -2505 (Supp. 2006)).
209. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-113(B), -2505(11) (Supp. 2006).
210. See id.; id. §§ 54.1-3011.1, -3011.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
211. See id. § 54.1-2928.1 (Supp. 2006).
212. Id. § 54.1-2928.1(A) (Supp. 2006).
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dered by the volunteer practitioner at least every ninety days.2 13
The fees for the restricted volunteer license will be no more than
one-half of the renewal fee for a similar inactive license, and the
restricted license may be renewed every two years.2 14
When a complaint has been filed with the DHP regarding a
health care provider and the relevant board determines not to
conduct a disciplinary proceeding, that board may now send an
advisory letter to the provider who was the subject of the complaint. 21" The board may also inform the complainant that (1) an
investigation has been conducted, (2) the matter was closed with
no disciplinary proceeding, and (3) if appropriate, an advisory letter was sent to the subject of the complaint.21 6
The legislature further extended the time period within which
a hearing must be held for the practitioner who has applied for
reinstatement of a license which was suspended.2 1 7 Previously,
the practitioner was entitled to a hearing within thirty days of receipt of the application for reinstatement, 218 but that time has
been extended to sixty days.2 19
VII. CONCLUSION
In response to the ever-changing and fast-growing arena of
medical malpractice law, the General Assembly established the
Joint Subcommittee to Study Risk Management Plans for Physicians and Hospitals. 22 ' The Joint Subcommittee was continued
once in 2005, and, in 2006, the General Assembly again continued
the Joint Subcommittee and ordered it to report its findings to
the Assembly in 2007.221 This committee was directed to study
the effectiveness of the current laws regarding medical malpractice, as well as the feasibility of establishing a multi-jurisdictional
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216.
217.
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219.
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Id. § 54.1-2928.1(C) (Supp. 2006).
Id. § 54.1-2928.1(D), (F) (Supp. 2006).
Id. § 54.1-2400.2(F) (Supp. 2006).
Id.
Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 367, 2006 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
54.1-2409(D) (Supp. 2006)).
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2409(D) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
Id. (Supp. 2006).
Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 822, cl. 2, 2004 Va. Acts 1264.
H.J. Res. 183, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2006).
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pilot health court and, subsequently, a network of health courts
throughout the commonwealth.2 2 2 While the findings of this committee drastically may alter the current landscape of medical
malpractice law, one thing remains certain: as long as there are
health care providers and patients, medical malpractice law will
remain.

222.
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